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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONGO

Secretary General Thant has ordered the UN command in the Congo to "seal off" Kindu, disarm the Congo Army units there, and start inquiries into


the massacre of the 13 Italian airmen; an undisclosed number of UN troops have been moved to Kindu. [REDACTED]

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Republic of the Congo



The president of the Leopoldville provincial government, pro-Gizengist Cleophas Kamitatu, told Ambassador Gullion on 16 November it would be "criminal" if the UN used force at Kindu and that he intended to tell Adoula that if the UN

did so without comparable measures against Katanga, the "nationalist" group would withdraw its support of Adoula. General Mobutu has remarked that without complete "political, military, and financial" unity between the Stanleyville and Leopoldville forces, it would be impossible to defeat Katanga. Press reports indicate that Adoula is stalling on his investigation of the Kindu incident.

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[redacted] reports that it is difficult to establish whether Gizenga was actually responsible for the Kindu incident, although his presence and inflammatory propaganda against the UN over a long period created the atmosphere for it. Gizenga's objective in going to Kindu was probably to demonstrate that it was he who was actively pushing the invasion of Katanga rather than Leopoldville or General Lundula.

Gizenga's present whereabouts is unknown. Interior Minister Gbenye, recently returned from Kindu, advised the Adoula cabinet on 20 November that Gizenga was not in Kindu at the time of the atrocities. He may turn up in Stanleyville for a belated rump convention of his Lumumbist party, which he had called for 18 November. Gizenga's rivals, although not opposed to the formation of a new single national party, are opposed to his heading it. On 20 November, the Leopoldville cabinet reportedly decided to make another attempt to bring Gizenga back to the capital, and three nominal Gizengist sympathizers were to be sent to Stanleyville to try to locate him.

Leopoldville's failure to date to control Tshombé either by negotiation or force has created strong pressures on Adoula. The "nationalists," who apparently hold the UN and not the Congolese military responsi-

ble for the action in Kindu, are growing impatient and reportedly intend henceforth to take a rigid line with the premier on both the Katanga problem and on Congo's neutralism. They are pressing to have the Soviet bloc representative in Leopoldville accredited soon and assert that both Soviet and American presence is necessary to ensure the neutrality of the UN. They also want to be able to "weigh" Soviet and American offers of aid.

[redacted] tary and economic aid. The offer reportedly included transport and military aircraft, arms, agricultural and road-construction machinery, and a financial subsidy. Foreign Minister Bomboko previously told US officials that the Soviets in negotiating for the re-establishment of relations had offered "all aid" to the Adoula government.

Tshombé has not changed his demands that Adoula recognize Katanga's virtual autonomy, which he knows Adoula cannot accept and remain in power. [redacted]

[redacted] Tshombé plans to continue public statements of "guarded good will" toward Leopoldville to encourage Western support of his position. Katangan hopes, [redacted] are based on the prospects that the Adoula regime will deteriorate and reduce its demands, and that trouble between UN and Congo Army troops will continue. [redacted]

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